

1 when asked what happened, the woman stated that defend-
2 ant had physically assaulted her and tried to suffocate
3 her baby. This qualified as a spontaneous statement
4 (Id. at p. 1388.)

5
6 The second aspect of section 1240 is to describe actions
7 undertaken without deliberation or reflection. The latter
8 is what is intended in (Evidence Code section 1240)
9 (People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903.) In Farmer,
10 the Court approved admission of spontaneous statements
11 uttered in response to a lengthy police interrogation
12 because the declarant was in intense pain from gunshot
13 wounds, rightfully concerned about his survival, and
14 so preoccupied that he had little opportunity and incen-
15 tive to deliberate. (Id. at p. 904; see also (People v. Paggi,
16 supra 45 Cal.3d, at p. 319-320) [statements admissible
17 on facts similar to Farmer].)

18
19 At the same time, however, the Farmer Court cautioned that
20 it is a rare thing to permit the admission of answers to
21 extensive and belated questioning as spontaneous utter-
22 ances. (People v. Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 904.) Indeed,
23 the general rule is that statements made in response to
24 questions posed by officers after the declarant has time to
25 reflect should not be admitted. (People v. Keelin (1955) 136
26 Cal.App.2d, 860, 820) [error to admit as spontaneous
27 statements responses to questions a considerable time after
28 the event.].) Further, although a time element may not be

1 mechanically applied, it is an important factor. (See also
2 Wiley V. Easter (1962) 203 Cal. App. 2d 845, 854-855)
3 [Questions from a police officer some 20-60 minutes
4 after the event require the declarant to pause and think;
5 responses not spontaneous statements.]

6
7 In People V. Pearch (1991) 229 Cal. App. 3d 1282) about
8 an hour or 45 minutes before his death, the victim's
9 called his brother, told him he was being hurt, and asked
10 to borrow money. (Id. at p. 1288.) The trial court admitted
11 the victim's statement that he was being hurt as a spontan-
12 eous statement. (Id. at p. 1289.) The reviewing court
13 disagreed because there was nothing in the record
14 suggesting the victim did not have an opportunity
15 to reflect in the interim between the time he was hurt
16 and the time of the phone call. Nothing in the record
17 showed he was in an excited ~~state~~ state and unable
18 to reflect or deliberate when he made that call (Id.
19 at pp. 1290-1291.) Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting
20 the victim's statements under the spontaneous declarations
21 exception to the hearsay rule (Id. at p. 1291.) The court
22 reversed the defendant's conviction for the erroneous
23 admission of hearsay statements. (Id. at p. 1295.)

24
25 The statements in the instant case do not fall within the
26 parameters established by the statute or decisional law
27 because the declarant was not near death or suffering
28 intense pain, and because, as was the situation in Pearch,

1 Tanette had ample of time to clam herself, discuss the events
2 with Martinez and her mother, brush her teeth, make phone calls
3 and deliberate before responding to the officers' questions.

4
5 When the prosecutor started to elicit from officer Mendoza
6 hearsay consisting of what Tanette told him in response to
7 his question during his interview with Tanette, Moran's attorney
8 objected on hearsay grounds. The Court sustained the objection.
9 (6 RT 1580-1581.) The prosecutor insisted that the hearsay was
10 admissible as a prior inconsistent statement and not admitted
11 for the truth of the matter. Petitioner objected and sought an
12 offer of proof. (6 RT 1584.) The Court ordered the prosecutor
13 to make such an offer but not satisfied with that offer
14 delayed ruling until the following day. (6 RT 1587.)

15
16 The very next morning the defense came prepared to argue that
17 the doctrine of prior inconsistent statements did not apply.
18 (7 RT 1806-1810.) But, without notice to the defense, the prosecutor
19 changed tactics, now arguing that Tanette's responses to the
20 officer's questions really were "spontaneous utterances"
21 and presenting the Court with cases on that new subject. (7 RT
22 1804-1806.)

23
24 Petitioner objected vehemently because there was nothing
25 "spontaneous" about her responses to the police officer's questions.
26 The crime started at 3:15 am. The officer took her statement
27 (Two hours) Later. (7 RT 1813; 2 CT 387.) The prosecutor argued
28 there was only a nine (9) minute interval between the end of

1 the crime and Officer Mendoza's interview (7 RT 1815-1816.) That
2 is a virtual impossibility. As Counsel explained, the prosecutor
3 was "Playing games with the clock." (7 RT 1817-1818.) First,
4 Janette and Martinez sat in his car for ten or 15 minute after
5 their assailants left, discussed the matter and what had
6 happened to Janette, and jointly decided what to do.

7
8 "And on the way to Janette's house we were thinking and trying
9 to decide whether to make a report or not to make a report to
10 the police about the incident. [9.] And we got to the agreement
11 that we had to make a report" (4 RT 386:5-10 5 RT 645;
12 6 RT 1319.)

13
14 Martinez drove Janette home (6 RT 1316-1317.) Janette told her
15 mother what happened, but thoughtfully edited what she told
16 her mother, carefully omitting all mention of the purported
17 sexual assaults. (6 RT 1317-1318.) She brushed her teeth
18 and gargled. (9 RT 3400.) Obviously concerned that Taco Bell
19 managers would believe Martinez and Janette were responsible
20 for the theft, before they called police, they called the Taco
21 Bell manager, but got no answer. Next, they called the assist-
22 ant store manager, but still did not get an answer. (4 RT 386-387.)

23
24 Finally, they were able to reach the store's shift manager and
25 explain what happened. (6 RT 321.) After all this, the police
26 were called (6 RT 1321.) Far more than nine minutes had
27 to have elapsed. And, by the time the police arrived, interven-
28 ing discussions and events calmed any residual stress and

64

1 Fear (see 7-RT-1824.) In fact, immediately after the
2 interview Janette was taken to the hospital for examin-
3 ation and described as cooperative and "very quiet
4 and reserved" (9 RT-3327.)

5
6 The court decided the statements were not excited utterances,
7 but spontaneous statements made without time to reflect,
8 consider, or fabricate. According to the court Janette's state-
9 ments to the officer qualified because she was "In a state
10 of shock, scared to death, hysterical" and the passage of
11 time and intervening event were not relevant (7 RT 1831.)

12 The officer testimony was admissible as a spontaneous state-
13 ment, but not as a prior inconsistent statement. (7 RT 1832.) The
14 court was mistaken because, as explained above, it was unrea-
15 sonable to believe that Janette was still "under the stress of
16 excitement" (See *In re Daniel Z.* (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1009,
17 1022.)

18
19 C. Erroneous Admission of the Hearsay Evidence
20 was prejudicial

21
22 The jury has already heard Janette's testimony. The
23 officer who interviewed Janette, over vigorous objections,
24 was permitted to narrate from his report what Janette
25 said, thus repeating essentially the same facts Janette
26 testified about. (7 RT 1839-1843.)

27
28 Detective Michelle Gonzalez also responded to Janette's

home and interviewed her. Over hearsay and section 35.2 objection's the court permitted Detective Gonzalez to narrate what Janette said to her, expanding on Janette's testimony and going sentence by sentence from her report. (2RT 1905-1914, 1916-1918.) The court overruled the objection because everything Janette told officer Gonzalez were "spontaneous statements." (2RT 1920-1926.) The officer said that Janette said that her assailant was a short, chubby, dark haired Hispanic. (2RT 1927.) The officer continued to repeat what Janette purportedly told her (2RT 1927-1930.)

The jury should not have heard Janette's tale over and over again from the officers in the guise of spontaneous statements. Importantly, unlike the cases the prosecutor cited, there was no immediacy to Janette's statements to the officers. There were superseding intervening factors; time had passed. (2RT 1817-1819.) Still, through the officers the jury heard anew everything Janette had already testified about- thus doubling and tripling the prejudicial effect of her testimony. (2RT 1839-1843.) Having heard the details from Janette, repetition of those details could have had no other effect than to inflame the passions of the jury. That is prejudice.

Petitioner concedes that if this was the only error in this very lengthy trial, it would not be necessarily be so prejudicial as to constitute a due process violation and reversible error. But, it does so when considered in conjunction with the multiple error in this case. Accordingly as in *Pearch*, Petitioner Bautista's conviction of the Taco Bell offenses should be reversed for the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence in the guise of spontaneous statements.

Since this prejudicial evidentiary error undoubtedly affected the jury's deliberation on all counts

Ground #5

1 THE VERDICTS IN COUNTS 8, 9, AND 10 THE EL POLLO LOCO
2 INCIDENT, SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR INSUFFICIENT
3 EVIDENCE.

4
5 There is insufficient evidence to support Petitioner
6 Bontita's convictions of the counts related to the
7 EL Pollo Loco offenses.

8
9 A. Standard Review

10 "The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency
11 of the evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the
12 entire record a rational trier of fact could find the
13 defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On
14 appeal, [the reviewing court] must view the evidence
15 in the light most favorable to the people and must presume
16 in support of the judgment the evidence of every fact
17 the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence."
18 People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 294, 314; People v. Johnson
19 (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 557, 572.)

20
21 The evidence must be substantial; it is not enough for the
22 respondent to point to some evidence (People v. Johnson,
23 supra, 26 Cal. 3d at p. 572.) For evidence to be "substantial" it
24 must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value (Id. at p. 576.)
25 The "evidence" may have been sufficient to connect Moran
26 to the EL Pollo Loco offenses, but the identifications of
27 Petitioner were far too amorphous to constitute substantial
28 evidence connecting him to the crimes.

1 B. BECAUSE THE EYEWITNES IDENTIFICATIONS WERE NOT
2 CREDIBLE, APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERED

3
4 It is now well established that eyewitness identification
5 of strangers is extremely unreliable; "The vagaries of
6 eyewitness identification are well known; the annals of
7 Criminal Law are rife with instances of mistaken ident-
8 ification." (United State vs Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 288,
9 82, S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149.) As our Supreme Court
10 has observed;

11
12 "There is great potential for misidentification when a witness
13 identifies a stranger based solely upon a single brief
14 observation and this risk is increased when the observation
15 was made at a time of stress or excitement.... [This]
16 danger is inherent in every identification of this kind...
17 The problem is important because of all the evidence
18 that may be presented to a jury, a witness' in-court
19 statement that 'he is the one' is probably the most dram-
20 atic and persuasive" People vs McDonald (1984) 32 Cal.
21 3d, 351, 363-364, ¹⁹ quoting United State vs Russell (6 Cir,
22 1976) 532 F.2d 1063, 1066.)

23
24 There were four witnesses who testified about the El Pollo
25 Loco burglary, Louca, Black, Ivan, Estrada, Nancy Salangsang,
26 and Martin Ocas, Estrada was not able to identify anyone,
27 (HRT 4571.) Black was able to identify Meron from a photo six pack
28 (NO. 2 Position) and in court only as "someone who most resembled

1 the man with the gun.

2
3 ¹⁹ Overruled on another point in *People vs Mendoza* (2000)

4 23 Cal 4th 896, 914.

5
6 (11 RT 4226, 4289, 4295, 4301.) Black was unable to identify
7 Bautista in a lineup or in court (11 RT 4292-4294.)

8
9 Cross-racial identifications are among the most unreliable.

10 *People vs McDonald*, supra 32 Cal 3d at p 364 & fn 9.)

11 Nancy Salangsang a Filipina woman who testified through

12 a Tagalog interpreter, described the man who grabbed her,

13 pressed a gun into her back, and pushed her into the

14 kitchen and thence into a back office, as neither fat

15 nor thin (11 RT 4528-4580 12 RT 5108) Petitioner is a short

16 Hispanic man. He is "heavy-set" and "fat" (5 RT 657-658.)

17 Salangsang did not recognize anyone in a photo six pack

18 containing Petitioner's picture or in a live lineup (12 RT

19 4842, 4863, 4823.) Nonetheless, in court Salangsang

20 purportedly identified Petitioner who is very heavy, as

21 the "neither fat nor thin" man who grabbed her (11 RT 4528;

22 12 RT 4829.) The prosecutor did her best to confuse Salang-

23 sang and suggest to the jury that she did identify

24 Bautista before trial when she did not. (See 12 RT 4815-

25 4824.) The court blithely overruled repeated objections

26 that the prosecutor was twisting the truth and misleading

27 the jury. (12 RT ⁴⁸17.)

28

1 In view of the vast difference in the description Salang-
 2 sang gave right after the Crime and Petitioner's actual
 3 appearance, her inability to pick him out of a photo array
 4 or live lineup shortly after the crimes, the prosecutor's
 5 unwillingness to accept the fact that Salangsang did
 6 not indentify Petitioner before Trial, and considering
 7 the unreliability of cross-racial identification's, Salang-
 8 Sang's in-court identification two years after the
 9 fact lacks all Credibility.

11 That leaves Martin Oros. After the robbery, Oros described
 12 one of the robbers as a white male 5'6" tall Clean shaven,
 13 and thin²⁰ (12 RT 4511.) Again Petitioner Bautista is obviously
 14 "Hispanic and fat" neither "whiter" or "thin." In the prosecutor's
 15 direct examination she use so many exhibits numbers and
 16 asked so many misleading questions that Oros ~~became so~~
 17 hopelessly confused it is virtually impossible to determine
 18 who he had indentify and when (12 RT 4505-4509.)

19 In fact, Oros admitted he was Confused by which lineup
 20 the prosecutor's asked about in her direct examination
 21 (12 RT 4522.) This makes his in-court identification
 22 (12 RT 4504) of Bautista as the thin, white man who hit
 23 him in the face at El Palla Loco unbelievable. Oros' indent-
 24 ification of Bautista is Lacking all reasonable, Credible,
 25 solid value.

27 All of these witness were under extreme stress in a violent
 28 situation controlled by at least one man with a gun,

1. psychological factors recognized as leading to
2. misidentifications (People vs McDonald supra 3d Cal
3. 3d at pp. 362, 325-326.) In addition, the identification
4. of strangers is highly suspect when no other evidence
5. connects the accused to the crime (Id at pp. 362, 363).
6. In the instant case, nothing - no fingerprints, no face-
7. pic of any kind - connected Petitioner to the El Valle
8. Loco burglary and robberies. Petitioner's convictions of
9. Counts 8, 9, and 10 should be reversed for want of
10. sufficient evidence.

11. ²⁰
12. Deas described the second man as a male Hispanic wearing
13. a blue baseball cap. He did not see this man face although
14. he heard him speak Spanish (12 RT 4512) However, a blue
15. cap was identified as belonging to codefendant Maran.

16.
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28.

Ground #6

71

1. INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL
 2. AND DUE PROCESS

3.
 4. Court and Counsel argued and fought over jury instructions
 5. in marathon sessions held over seven days and continuing
 6. even after the jury began deliberating - with the prosecutor
 7. generally prevailing (2 CT 445, 450, 454, 458, 463, 466.)
 8. In the end there were at least two serious instructional
 9. errors. The first was CALJIC NO. 3.00/3.02,²¹ a hybrid
 10. instruction in which the prosecution grafted a portion
 11. of the natural probable consequences doctrine onto the
 12. aiding and abetting instruction, but failed to identify
 13. target offenses or which crimes were the unintended
 14. result of the target crimes. The second was not limiting
 15. CALJIC NO. 2.06 to defendant Macan when it was his
 16. family members who allegedly threatened Janette A.²²
 17. This error infected the conviction of both the Taco Bell
 18. charges and the El Pollo Loco charges.

19.
 20. ²¹ CALJIC NO. 3.00 Provides:
 21. "Persons who are involved in [committing] [or] [attempting]
 22. to commit] a crime are referred to as principals in that
 23. crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner
 24. of participation is equally guilty. Principals include: [9]
 25. 1. Those who directly and actively [commit] [or] [attempt to
 26. commit] the act constituting the crime, or [9] 2. Those who
 27. aid and abet the [commission] [or] [attempted commission]
 28. of the crime.

1 CAL JIC No. 3.02 Provides:

2 "One who aids and abets [another] in the commission of a
3 crime [or crimes] is not only guilty of [that crime] [those
4 crimes], but is also guilty of any other crime ~~committed~~
5 by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence
6 of the crime[s] originally aided and abetted.

7 "In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] of
8 [as charged in Count[s] _____] you must be satisfied beyond
9 a reasonable doubt that;

10 "1 The crime [or crimes] of _____ [was] [were] committed;

11 "2 That the defendant aided and abetted [that] [those crimes];

12 "3 That co-principal in that crime committed the [crime[s]] of _____ and

13 "4 The crime[s] of _____ [was] [were] a natural and probable consequence
14 of the commission of the crime[s] of _____ "

15 A. Scope and Standard of Review

16 A trial court has a duty to instruct on the general
17 principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence,
18 that is, those closely and openly connected with the facts
19 before the court which are necessary for the jury's under-
20 standing of the case. *People vs Sedena* (1974) 10 Cal.3d
21 703, 715, ²³ quoting *People vs St. Martin* (1970) 7 Cal.3d 524,
22 531.) A criminal defendant is entitled to accurate
23 jury instructions. (See, e.g., *People vs LeCarno* (2003)
24 109 Cal. App. 4th 1058, 1070, [reversing conviction
25 because of erroneous instruction 1.]
26
27
28

73

22

1 CALJIC NO. 2.06, instructs:

2 "If you find that a defendant attempted to suppress evidence
3 against [himself] [herself] in any manner, such as [by
4 the intimidation of a witness] [by an offer to compensate
5 a witness] [by destroying evidence] [by concealing
6 evidence] [by], this attempt may be considered by
7 you as a circumstance tending to show a conscious-
8 ness of guilt. However, this conduct is not sufficient
9 by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and signifi-
10 cance, if any, are for you to decide.

23

12 Overruled on another point in *People vs Blakeley*
13 (2000) 23 Cal 4th 82, 89.

14
15 In reviewing a claim of instructional error, the Court
16 considers the jury instructions as a whole in the
17 context of the charge and ~~the entire trial record.~~
18 (*People vs Waskett* (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 210, 235.) An inaccurate
19 or misleading instruction is grounds for reversal
20 when it cannot be said that the instruction was
21 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *People v Lee*
22 (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 666, 676, *Chapman vs California*,
23 *supra*, 386 U.S. at p. 24.

24
25 B. NO PART OF CALJIC NO. 3.02 should have been grafted
26 onto NO. 3.00 Because the Prosecution's Theory was both
27 Defendants were Principals.

70-71

1 This is the instructions the Court gave over multiple objections;

2
3 "One who aids and abets another in the commission of a
4 crime is not only guilty of that crime, but is also
5 guilty of any other crime committed by the principal,
6 which is a natural and probable consequence of
7 the crime originally aided and abetted."

8
9 "Whether a consequence is natural and probable is an
10 objective test based not on what the defendant actually
11 intended, but what a person of reasonable and ordinary
12 prudence would have expected would be likely to occur."

13
14 "The issue is to be decided in light of all of the circum-
15 stances surrounding the incident."

16
17 "A 'natural consequence' is one which is within the normal
18 range of outcome that may be reasonably expected to
19 occur if nothing unusual has intervened."

20
21 "Probable" means likely to happen." (17 RT 8720-8721.)²⁴

22
23 We start with the basic principal that accomplice
24 instructions should not be given when the defendant is
25 charged as a principal. People vs Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.
26 4th 248, 268-269 [instruction should not been given
27 when prosecution has not elected to rely on that particular
28 theory of accomplice liability] People vs Brown supra 31 Cal

14th at p 559.) As this Court has observed:

2 "
3 The trial should grant a prosecutor's request that the
4 Jury be instructed on the natural and probable
5 consequences' rule only when (1) the record contains
6 substantial evidence that the defendant intended
7 to encourage or assist a confederate in committing a
8 target offense, and (2) the jury could reasonably find
9 that the crime actually committed by the defendant's
10 confederate was a 'natural and probable consequence'
11 of the specifically contemplated target offense. IF
12 this test is not satisfied, an instruction should not be
13 given, even if specifically requested." People vs Gonzalez
14 (2002) 49 Cal App 4th 475, 485, quoting People vs Dawson
15 (1997) 60 Cal App 4th 534, 544, emphasis added.)

16
17 ²⁴ This version of No. 300 was not on the original packet of
18 instructions given to the jury. The court read the instructions
19 to the jurors and provided them with a hard copy (12RT 8221.)
20 but a hard copy did not make it into the clerk's
21 Transcript.

22
23 The test was not satisfied here. Throughout the trial the
24 prosecutor insisted that each defendant ~~was~~ ^{was a} principal
25 not an aider and abettor - in the alleged crimes. Aiding
26 and abetting instructions should not have been given at
27 all. A botched version of CALTIC No. 3.00 which incorporated
28 some but not all elements of the natural and probable

1. Consequence doctrine should never have been given either.

2.
3. In Instruction No. 300 was defective because the Court never
4. defined the target crimes.

5.
6. In *People vs. Pettyman*, *supra*, 14 Cal. 4th 248, the Court held that
7. when a trial Court instructs on the "natural and probable
8. consequences" doctrine, the Court must identify and describe
9. the target crimes contemplated by the defendant. Otherwise,
10. there is a risk that the jury will "indulge in unguided
11. speculation." (*Id.* at p. 272.) It is error to give the instruction
12. without expressly defining any target offenses. *People*
13. *vs. Sakarias* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 596, 627, 628.)

14.
15. Appellant has preserved the error for appellate review. Court
16. and Counsel engaged in lengthy discussions as to
17. whether the Court should accede to the prosecutor's request
18. for CALJIC No. 3.02 on natural and probable consequences
19. should be given. (3 CT 529; 14 RT 630; 16 RT 9558-2526.)
20. The Court decided not to give it because

21.
22. "The way it is presently worded is more confusing to the
23. members of the jury than not, and it does not help the
24. jury to give 3.02. If we can't ourselves agree it makes
25. absolutely no sense to give it to the jury who have not been
26. trained in legal analysis and would be further confused,
27. would send questions out, no doubt trying to get a handle
28. on what 3.02 says. [9] And to me, this case is not all that

1 difficult from a legal analysis. I just don't see any point
2 in giving them 3.02 (16 RT 7566; 3 CT 529)

3
4 After the Court ruled that No. 3.02 would not be given
5 because "it would confuse this jury" the prosecutor with-
6 drew the instruction. (16 RT 7576-7577) The next day
7 the prosecutor submitted a new instruction which
8 appended one concept from No. 3.02 onto No. 300:

9
10 "One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime,
11 is not only guilty of that crime, but is also guilty of any
12 other crime committed by the principal, which is a natural
13 and probable consequence of the crime originally aided
14 and abetted." (17 RT 8440.)

15
16 Appellant objected and move for a mistrial because "natural
17 and probable" was not defined. The prosecutor's instruction
18 did not explain to the jury what a target crime is or
19 which crimes this newly-submitted instruction involved
20 (15 RT 8114-8118.)

21
22 "I can see the jury looking at this and saying, well,
23 we can convict Bautista for a crime because he aided
24 and abetted. Mr. Moran, when the intention of this
25 instruction when given originally was how would
26 this conduct of Mr. Bautista affect Mr. Moran"
27 (16 RT 8117; 20-21)

1 "This just gives a blank three-line statement of the Law which
2 may or not be accurate. But it doesn't explain natural and
3 probable consequence as 3.02 did. 177 The Court said well
4 3.02 is too confusing for us; so, therefore it will be too confusing
5 for the jury. So, to give them this three line paragraph
6 and not define this concept for them is grossly misleading"
7 (16 RT 8118:1-7.)

8
9 The Court overruled the objection and denied the motion
10 for mistrial (16 RT 8116, 8118; 17 RT 8403.) The Court was
11 "not convinced that it would be a reversible error or so
12 prejudicial that it would be a denial of due process" to give
13 the prosecutor's instruction. (17 RT 8445.)

14
15 After the Court ruled it would give the prosecutor's requested
16 instruction, the Court invited Counsel to submit his own
17 instruction if he was unhappy with the prosecutor's
18 submission (16 RT 8119.) But, when Counsel examined the packet
19 of "final" instructions the Court assembled for the jury, the
20 offending natural and probable consequence language had
21 been deleted from No. 3.00. This led Counsel to believe that
22 the Court reconsidered and struck that language (17 RT 8441
23 8443-8444)

24
25 However, when reading the instruction to the jury, the Court gave
26 the prosecutor's modified version of No. 3.00. This immediately
27 brought the attorneys to their feet. They learned that the "final"
28 packet the Court provided to them and the jurors did not

1 match the court's packet because neither the defense attorneys
2 nor the jurors had the prosecutor's No. 3.00. Appellant
3 renewed his objection. (P2 RT 8441) The Court then advised
4 the jurors it would give them the modified version of
5 No. 3.00 thus calling specific attention to that instruction
6 above all others. (12 RT 8440-8443.) Counsel ask the Court
7 not to further highlight No. 3.00 until the Court heard further
8 argument on the instruction. (12 RT 8486.)

9
10 Appellant objected anew. The borrowed sentence is part of
11 a more complete instruction which was not clear. There are parts
12 of No. 3.02 that are necessary for the Jury's understanding
13 including the definition of natural and probable consequences
14 and target offenses. (17 RT 8447.) Appellant asked that
15 further language from No. 3.02 defining the phrase "natural
16 and probable consequences" be added to No. 3.00 (17 RT 8708
17 8709.) Appellant concluded, "I don't think the sentence
18 [the prosecutor inserted from No. 3.02] should be added. But
19 if the Court is bent on adding it define it" (17 RT 8709, 25-28.)
20 In doing so however, appellant expressly preserved his objection
21 to the grafting of some language from 3.02 onto 3.00 (17 RT 8714.)
22 The Court decided to give the remedification. (12 RT 8711.)

23
24 The natural and probable consequences doctrine is triggered
25 when the perpetrator ultimately commits some different or
26 additional crime than the intended offense (People vs. Culwick
27 (2000) 28 Cal App 4th 302, 322.) Thus "identification of the target
28 crime will facilitate the jury's task of determining whether

1 the charged crime allegedly committed by the aider and
 2 abettor's confederate was indeed a natural and probable
 3 consequence of any uncharged target crime that the
 4 prosecution contends the defendant knowingly and intentionally
 5 aided and abetted." *People vs Pettyman*, *supra*, 14 Cal 4th at p. 267)

6
 7 The biggest flaw in the hybrid instruction was that neither
 8 the target crimes nor the crime that was the natural and
 9 probable consequence of the target crime were neither identified
 10 although the erroneous instruction affected nearly half of the
 11 charges, counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, contrary to the prosecution's
 12 contention, descriptions of the charged offenses in the jury
 13 instruction cannot suffice for identification of target crimes
 14 which in turn led to some other crime (19 RT 11412.) As noted
 15 above, the failure to identify and define target crimes renders
 16 the instruction erroneous. (*People vs Sakarias*, *supra*, 22 Cal.
 17 4th at pp. 627-628; see also *People vs Hickles* (1997) 56 Cal.
 18 App 4th 1183-1193-1195) [failure to identify target crimes
 19 is prejudicial error]; *People vs Moutan* (1993) 15 Cal. App.
 20 4th 1313, 1315 [same].²⁵

21
 22 2. MODIFIED INSTRUCTION NO. 3.00 GENERATED IRREPARABLE
 23 PREJUDICE,

24
 25 In *Pettyman*, the court found the failure to identify a
 26 target crime was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
 27 because there was only one potential target crime
 28 shown by the evidence, assault with a deadly weapon.

1 which led to the natural and probable consequence of
2 murder. (People vs Pettyman, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at p. 267.)
3 In sharp contrast, in (People vs Hickles, supra 56 Cal App.
4 4th 1183, the evidence would have supported a number
5 of different factual scenarios. In reversing the conviction,
6 the court observed:

7
8 Overruled on another point in (People vs Pettyman, supra
9 14 Cal 4th at p. 238.)

10 "
11 While it is clear not all of those scenarios would support
12 a natural and probable consequences finding as a matter
13 of law, it is not obvious a jury of lay persons, lacking instruction
14 on target offenses, would not have viewed murder as a natural
15 and probable consequence of a simple assault or even an
16 argument, perhaps on a generalized view that things can get
17 out of hand in such altercations" (Id. at pp. 1197-1198.)

18
19 Assuming the instruction should have been given at all there
20 are multiple scenarios here too. There were 11 counts against
21 each defendant, susceptible to varying mixing and matching
22 of target and unintended offenses. It is impossible to
23 know what the jury did with the incomplete instruction.
24 It is reasonably likely, however, that the jury packaged
25 one or more of the robbery and burglary offenses as the
26 unintended consequence of a kidnap for rape. In the
27 alternative the jury could have decided that the sexual
28 offenses were the unintended consequence of kidnap for robbery.

1 I sum, the instruction is woefully incomplete. It did not
2 identify the target offense, did not set forth the idea of a
3 further crime being a natural and probable consequence
4 of the target offense, did not define natural and probable
5 consequences as being an objective test, not a subjective
6 test. It allowed the Jury to think that natural and
7 probable consequences meant that if you engage in
8 an intent to commit a burglary, anything thereafter that
9 happens is the natural and probable consequence of being
10 a criminal. It was that broad. It was that ill-defined.
11 The defective instruction left the jury rudderless.

12
13 Petitioner convictions should be reversed because it cannot be
14 said beyond a reasonable doubt that erroneous instruction
15 No. 3.00 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People vs
16 Hickles, supra, 56 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1198; People vs Giardino (2000)
17 82 Cal App. 4th 454, 470, 471 [Failure to define required element
18 not harmless error, I; People vs LeCorno, supra, 109 Cal App. 4th
19 at p. 1070 [Failure to define "Knowledge" not harmless beyond
20 a reasonable doubt.])

21
22 C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT LIMITING CALJIC NO. 2.06
23 TO CODEFENDANT MORAN BECAUSE IT WAS HIS FAMILY WHO
24 ALLEGEDLY THREATENED PROSECUTION WITNESS JANETTE A.

25
26 A member or member of Codefendant Moran's family allegedly
27 threatened prosecution witness Janette A. if she testified.
28 Over Moran's objections, the court instructed with CALJIC

1 No 2.06 on witness intimidation, but did not limit the instruct-
2 ion to Codefendant Moran. This was error because the instruct-
3 ion should never have been given in the first instance.
4 Moreover, petitioner Bautista was just an unrelated taxi
5 driver (2 CT 282.) There was no evidence he was related
6 to Moran's extended family, or that he played any role
7 in the alleged threats.

8
9 1. CAL JIC NO. 2.06 should not have been given

10
11 Codefendant Moran objected at the length to this instruction
12 because there was no evidence he had anything to do with the
13 alleged threats to Janette and directed the Court's attention
14 to *People vs Williams* (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 153.²⁶ (13 RT 5227-5232;
15 14 RT 6358-6360.)²⁷

16 THE COURT INSTRUCTED:

17
18 IF you find that an effort to suppress evidence was made
19 by another person for the defendant's benefit, you may
20 not consider that effort as tending to show the defendant's
21 consciousness of guilt, unless you also find that the
22 defendant authorized that effort.

23
24 " IF you find defendant authorized the effort, that conduct
25 is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and it's [sic]
26 weight and significance, if any, are for you to decide
27 (12 RT 8426-8427.)

28

26

1 Cert den (1998) 522 U.S. 1150, 118 S. Ct 1169, 140 L.Ed.2d

129

2
3 ²⁷Appellant Bautista did not object to the instruction
4 or ask that it be limited to Maran. Bautista seeks
5 appellate review pursuant to section 1259 which provides
6 for review despite the absence of an objection where
7 as here, the "substantial rights" of the defendant are
8 affected. 2.06 error reviewed under section 1259.1)

9
10 In Williams, the Court reiterated the rule that a witness
11 intimidation instruction should not be given in the absence of
12 evidence that the defendant authorized the threat.

13
14 "Generally, evidence of the attempt of third person to suppress
15 testimony is inadmissible against a defendant where the
16 effort did not occur in his presence. However, if the defend-
17 ant has authorized the attempt of the third person to suppress
18 testimony, evidence of such conduct is admissible against
19 the defendant." (People vs Williams supra, 16 Cal 4th at
20 p.200, quoting (People vs Hannon, supra, 19 Cal. 3d at p. 599.)
21 internal punctuation and citation omitted.)

22
23 Proof of a Criminal defendant's 'mere opportunity' to
24 authorize a third person to attempt to influence a witness
25 has no value as circumstantial evidence 'that the defendant
26 did so' (People vs Williams, supra, 16 Cal 4th at p. 200) quoting
27 People vs Terry (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 538 566.) In People vs
28 Hannon, supra, 19 Cal 3d at p. 599, the Court held it was

1 reversible error to instruct with No. 2, 06 because the evidence
2 failed "to supply the necessary nexus between defendant
3 and the alleged suppression of evidence" In *People vs.*
4 *Terry supra*, 57 Cal.2d 538, the Court held that circumstantial
5 evidence in the form of personal relationships do not establish
6 that the defendant himself authorized an attempt to suppress
7 evidence. Because of the instructional error on this point
8 during the penalty phase, the Court reversed the death
9 sentence. (Id. at pp. 565-566.)

10
11 The instruction on the instant case rests of the circumstantial
12 evidence of Maran's familial and personal relationships.
13 Janette's friend and neighbor, Karla Campos, is the girlfriend
14 of Guillermino "Meno" Sandoval, the third man involved
15 in the robberies (5 RT 984, 1005, 1031; 2 CT 283.) Janette also
16 knows Lidia Batres, Meno's sister, and their brother, Carlos.
17 Another of Janette's friends is Karina, whose boyfriend
18 is Carlos (5 RT 985, 1013, 1031.) Codefendant Maran was
19 related to Janette's friends, although she denied knowing
20 this (6 RT 1234-1235) see also 13 RT 5231.

21
22 Two weeks before the Taco Bell burglary, Lidia Batres
23 called Janette and threatened her, "Take care of your back.
24 But maybe it was not Ms. Batres calling (Compare 5 RT
25 1018, 1022, with 6 RT 1240.) Janette reported the threat
26 to the investigating officer. (5 RT 1023-1049.) Two
27 weeks after the Taco Bell incident, Meno called Janette's
28 mother and told her to stop Janette from making accusations

1 about a robbery, (5RT-1024.) Another threatening Call Came
2 From Bates (5RT-1024-1025.)

3
4 These extended family and interpersonal relationships
5 are the only nexus between Moran and the alleged
6 threat. The evidence fall far short of that required
7 by Williams, Hannon and Terry. The instruction
8 should not have been given at all. In the alternative,
9 the Court should have limited the instruction to Moran.

10
11 2. BY NOT LIMITING THE INSTRUCTION TO MORAN, THE COURT
12 INVITED THE JURY TO SPECULATE THAT APPELLANT BAUTISTA
13 WAS IN ON THE THREATS

14
15 Evidence Code section 355 provides, "When evidence is admiss-
16 ible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible
17 as to another party or for another purpose, the Court
18 upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper
19 scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Hence, appellant
20 was entitled to have Cal. TIC No. 2.06 limited to Code-
21 pendant Moran. (People vs Perry (1972) 7 Cal 3d 256,
22 282, 288.)

23
24 In Perry, defendant Redman argued that the Trial Court
25 erred in failing to instruct the Jury that evidence
26 discovered in Perry's car was admissibly only against Perry
27 and solely for the purpose of establishing flight. The Court
28 agreed Redman was entitled to the instruction, but rejected

1 the claim because Redman had not asked for a limiting instruction. (Thid.) However, the opinion does not address review
2 under section 1259, or ineffective assistance of Counsel
3 for not seeking a limiting instruction. Cases are not authority
4 for propositions not considered. (People vs Saunders (1993)
5 5 Cal. 4th 580, 592, fn. 8.) In the instant case, appellant
6 Bautista seek review and reversal under section 1259
7 because his substantial rights are at issue. (See discussion
8 at p. 80 fn 2, supra.) In the alternative, his conviction
9 should be reversed for ineffective assistance of Counsel
10 because a reasonably competent attorney would have
11 asked that CALJIC No. 2.06 be limited to codefendant
12 Moran. (see discussion at pp. 35-36 supra.)
13
14

15 Because the jury was not instructed that the alleged threats
16 to Janette had nothing to do with Bautista, the jury was
17 free to speculate that if Bautista was being tried with
18 Moran, he must have been part and parcel of the threats.
19 Therefore, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt
20 that this instructional did not error contribute to the
21 verdict.
22

23 D. Appellant BAUTISTA'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE
24 REVERSED FOR PREJUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS.
25

26 It cannot be seriously disputed that hybrid instruction
27
28

1 number 3.00/3.02, was grossly defective. This instruction
2 could only have led to rampant speculation among the
3 jurors. Not can it be seriously argued that CAL TIC No.
4 2.06, if given at all should have been limited to Codefendant
5 Moran because it was his family members who purportedly
6 delivered the threats to Janette. This instruction undoubtedly
7 misled the jurors into believing they could include
8 appellant Bautista as one of the persons directing the
9 intimidation of Janette, and from that draw an inference
10 of guilt.

11
12 For all of the reasons given in this section, the trial court's
13 error cannot survive (Chapman) review because the record
14 does not demonstrate "beyond a reasonable doubt that
15 the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
16 obtained" (People vs Jensen (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 224,
17 239, quoting People vs Harris (1994) 9, Cal. 4th 402, 424.)
18 Appellant's convictions on all counts should be reversed
19 for instructional error (Chapman vs California supra,
20 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

21
22 Ground [#] 7

23 CUMULATIVE ERROR IN THIS CLOSE CASE DEPRIVED
24 APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL AND CONSTITUTED A
25 MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

26
27 Should this court decide the verdicts on counts 8, 9, and
28 10 are supported by substantial evidence, the judgment

1. of Conviction on all Counts Connected to both sets of offenses
2. nonetheless should be reversed for cumulative error. The
3. Trial was fraught with prejudicial errors, including
4. multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct which
5. started during voir dire and did not stop until the prosec-
6. utor got in the final and false word during her closing
7. argument.

8. 9. A. THE MANY ERRORS CREATED IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE

10.
11. The occurrence of many errors which, if considered separately,
12. might not be deemed seriously prejudicial are a ground
13. for reversal in a close case. The cumulative effect of
14. multiple errors is sufficient to warrant the conclusion
15. that the Trial was unfair and hence a miscarriage of
16. Justice occurred (People vs Hill supra, 17 Cal 4th at p.
17. 844.) In Hill Trial errors included prosecutorial miscon-
18. duct and instructional error with respect to intent to
19. Kill. The Court held that the number of instances of
20. prosecutorial misconduct, considered with other errors
21. created a negative effect that made overall unfairness
22. greater than the sum of individual errors and required
23. reversal (Id at pp. 844, 842.)

24.
25. In People vs Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal App 4th 285, 295, reversal
26. was required where there was a reasonable probability
27. the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict
28. but for the errors in People vs Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.

1 4th 835, 872, the errors as the penalty phase of a Capital
2 Case were numerous and serious, leading to the reasonable
3 possibility that, considered together, they affected the jury's
4 penalty determination. The Court reversed the judgment of
5 death.

6
7 As in Hill, Cuccia, and Hernandez, the errors in the instant
8 Case were numerous and serious. It is reasonably certain
9 appellant would have obtained a better result from a properly
10 instructed jury, unswayed by the prosecutor's improper
11 and misleading use of Bautista's statement.

12
13 B. REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THIS WAS A CLOSE
14 CASE WHERE THE PREJUDICIAL ERRORS HAD A DEVAS-
15 TATING EFFECT ON APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
16 TO A FAIR TRIAL.

17
18 The general rule is that in a close case i.e., one in which
19 the evidence is evenly balanced or sharply conflicting,
20 a lesser showing of errors justifies reversal. (6 Witkin
21 & Epstein, Cal. Crim. Law, supra, reversible Error § 45,
22 pp. 506-508 [collecting cases].) "The close case theory
23 is also applied where there is no dispute in the testi-
24 mony, but the inferences from it are conflicting" (Id. at
25 p. 508, emphasis in original see People v Moore (1954)
26 43 Cal.2d 517, 530.)

91

1 Although not dispositive, lengthy jury deliberations also
2 is evidence the case was close. "The fact that the jury deliber-
3 ated almost 22 hours over 5 days practically compels
4 the conclusion "the case was close. (Tore Martin (1987)
5 44 Cal.3d 751; but see People v Walker (1995) 31 Cal. App.
6 4th 432, 439, & lengthy deliberations could be reconciled
7 with jury's conscientious performance of its duty rather
8 than difficulty in reaching decision 1.)

9
10 Jurors questions and requests to have testimony reread
11 are indications the deliberations were close. People v's
12 Pearce supra, 229, Cal. App. 3d, at p. 1295; Maupin v's
13 Widdling (1988) 129 Cal. App. 3d 562, 572, 573; People v's
14 Fuentes (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 444, 456.)

15
16 At the onset of deliberations on May 13-2002 the jury
17 sent this question;

18 "
19 Are Counts #6 and #7 the same? Why are they 14 Counts
20 as mentioned on page 8. Should it be 12 Counts?" (2 C.T.
21 491; 17 RT 8772.)

22
23 Appellant asked the court to simply answer "No" and refer
24 the jurors to the last page of the information which
25 reflects the two dismissed counts. (17 RT 8774-8775.)
26 Appellant objected to the court's further instruction
27 of the jury (17 RT 8778.) The court responded to
28 the jury questions;

1 "NO. They're two separate robberies pled I'm If you have
2 further difficulty with that, I know myself where
3 the problem is, so if you have further difficulty with it,
4 the court will advise you further if you need further
5 instruction." (18 RT-9004.)

6
7 As to the question relating to the number of counts the
8 court explained:

9
10 what happened was you'll recalled after the people
11 close their case... I told you there was a motion that the
12 court had to hear outside the presence of the jury.
13 [91] As a result of the evidence presented during the
14 people's case in chief... the court dismissed count 12
15 and 13... and therefore, that reduced the number
16 of counts from 14 to 12" (18 RT-9004-9005.)

17
18 The next day the Jury asked for:

19
20 "① Re-reading from Pedro's testimony [] the section regarding
21 the ATM receipt and phone call from Bautista and Moran
22 regarding going to the ATM.

23 "② We have designated Count 6 as the \$10.00 and Count 7 as
24 the \$300.00. Is that acceptable?"

25 "③ In Count 6 and 7 can we separate the defendants or find both
26 guilty or not guilty? [B] because both are mentioned in the
27 Count?"

28 "④ We still need verdict forms and master copy of counts (2 CT 498-499,
18 RT 9026-9028)

1 The Court directed the reporter to read back the requested
2 testimony. (20T 505; 18RT 9045-9047.) The Court informed the Jury
3 it could acquit both, convict both or acquit one and convict
4 the other. (18RT 9032.) The Court explained that the "Clean"
5 Copy of the information provided to the Jury was the "Master
6 Copy" (18RT 9032-9034.)

7
8 As to question No. 2, the Court intended to instruct the Jurors
9 on the prosecutor's theories regarding these Counts²⁸ but
10 instead simply referred the Jurors to instruction No. 12.02
11 so as not to invade the province of the Jury. (18RT 9048,
12 9068.) However, it was clear from their question that the
13 Jury was under the impression that one of the robbery
14 Counts was robbery of the \$300 from the ATM. That robbery
15 was not charged. Rather, Count 6 was the robbery of \$1000
16 from Pedro Martinez's wallet and Count 7 was the robbery
17 from his constructive possession of the money in the Taco
18 Bell cash drawers.

19
20 Appellate asked the Court to instruct the Jury that the people
21 were not prosecuting appellant for the robbery based on the robbery
22 of the ATM. (18RT 9059.) Counsel stated, "I think they do need
23 to be told what the people's theory is as to those two robberies."
24 (18RT 9061:3-4.) This was so because all along the prosecutor
25 insisted the two robberies

26
27 ²⁸ The Court annotated the Jury's question from this: "14 Counts - 12
28 Counts and 13 were dismissed by Ct. at the end of Tl's case.

94

1 NO! Taco Bell Money.
2 "\$ in Martinez Wallet" (2CT 491.)

3
4 were the \$10.00 and the \$225 taken from the register at Taco
5 Bell. Half the jurors could convict on Count 2 based upon
6 the \$300 taken from the ATM, and the other half based on
7 the money taken from the cash registers (18RT 9062, 9064.)
8 The Court reversed its position and decided to tell the
9 jurors that Count 6 referred to the \$10.00 and Count
10 7 referred to robbery of the cash registers at Taco Bell,
11 and so informed the jury. (18RT 9070, 9304, 9302, 9308.)
12 By now of course, the Jury had been deliberating for
13 two days under a false assumption.

14
15 The Court still had not given the verdict forms to the Jury at
16 the end of the second full day of deliberations. (see 18RT
17 9073.) Finally at the beginning of the third day's
18 deliberations the Court provided the verdict forms
19 (18RT 9303) The Jury deliberated all of the third and
20 fourth days May 20, 21, and reached a verdict at the
21 end of the fifth day, P. May 22, (18RT 9901, 10501.)

22
23 The combination of jury confusion over the counts and the
24 Court's indecision and lack of preparation, in conjunction
25 with the Jury questions and requests for rereading of
26 testimony, demonstrates profound Juror confusion and
27 reflects a very close case. Accordingly, serious errors
28 at trial and chaotic deliberations cast severe doubt on

1 whether appellant Bautista obtained a fair trial. His
2 conviction should be reversed.

3 4 ARGUMENT

5 Appeal from the post-judgment Restitution Order No.
6 B 17 4565

7 Ground 8

8 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A \$41,000 RESTIT-
9 UTION FINE BECAUSE THIS SUM FAR EXCEEDED THE
10 VICTIM'S ACTUAL NET LOSS

11
12 Pedro Martinez had been compensated through the workers'
13 Compensation Act and the United State Unemployment
14 fund for most of the damages he suffered as a result
15 of the crimes. (RT 5-10-14-16-17.) Nonetheless the Court
16 ordered appellants jointly and severally to pay restitut-
17 ion in the amount of \$41,094.34, and directed Martinez
18 to use the restitution money to reimburse the workers'
19 Compensation insurer (Gallagher Bassett) for sum
20 expended on his behalf (RT 29 CT 92) This was error
21 because it amounted to an end run around the principle
22 established in People vs Birkett (1999) 21 Cal 4th 226,
23 that restitution dollars do not go to insurers, result in
24 a double recovery, and deprived appellant of his Eighth
25 Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
26 Punishment. (RT 25.)

27
28 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1 This issue requires construction of section 1202.4,
2 Subdivision (F). Construction of a statute is reviewed
3 de novo, with the aim of implementing the intent of
4 the legislature or, in this case, the intent of the people
5 who voted for Proposition 8. (E.g. *People v. Kennedy*
6 (2001) 91 Cal App. 4th 288, 291.)

7
8 In Proposition 8 the people expressed an unequivocal
9 intention that "all persons who suffer losses as a result
10 of Criminals. (Cal Const., art I § 28 Subd. (b). This measure
11 requires restitution to direct victims who have suffered
12 actual losses. (*People v. Birkett*, supra 21 Cal 4th, at p. 244.)
13 Penal Code section 1202.4 Subdivision (F) implements
14 that measure. It provides:

15 "
16 In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result
17 of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the
18 defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an
19 amount established by court order, based on the amount of
20 loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing
21 to the court. If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained
22 at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include
23 a provision that the amount shall be determined at the
24 discretion of the court. The court shall order full restitution
25 unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not
26 doing so, and states them on the record," 29

27 29
28 The prosecution relied on Gov. Code section 13967 as the basis

1 For awarding restitution to the victim, (C.T.66.) However, that
 2 section was repealed long before the restitution hearing.
 3 (Stats. 2002, Ch. 1141 § 10.)

4
 5 B. REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION AS A
 6 PASS-THROUGH TO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURER
 7 VIOLATES THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 1202.4

8
 9 In *People vs Birkett*, supra, 24 Cal 4th 226, the defendant
 10 purchased private insurance. The trial Court diverted
 11 part of the restitution award to reimburse private insurers
 12 and the Court of Appeal affirmed the order. Our Supreme
 13 Court reversed holding that insurers are not "direct victims"
 14 as envisioned by the plain language of [then] section
 15 1202.4 which governed restitution to be made by
 16 probationers to "direct victims" (Id at p. 244.) Birkett
 17 Court further observed that the line between probationers
 18 and incarcerated person no longer exists. (Id at p 247
 19 Pn 21.) Therefore the rule in all cases, probation and
 20 non-probation, is that the insurer is not entitled to
 21 recoup benefits through section 1202.4³⁰ yet the Court
 22 allowed exactly that when it ordered Martinez to deal
 23 with the workers' Compensation Board in reimbursing
 24 it from sums obtained from defendants (RT 29.

25
 26 This is what happened. Dr. Nehorayan treated Martinez
 27 from September 2001 to April 2003 for psychological injuries suffered
 28 as a result of the Kidnap and robbery at Taco Bell. (RT 4, 13.) The

30

1 we note this is not a case like *People vs O'Casey* (2001) 88 Cal
 2 App 4th 967, a fraud case where the workers' Compensation
 3 insurer itself was the direct victim of the criminal
 4 act and entitled to restitution. (see also *People v Molay*
 5 2000) 84 Cal App 4th 257 [direct restitution to insurers
 6 properly ordered upon conviction of Conspiracy to
 7 present false and fraudulent Claim to those insurers.]

8
 9 Prosecution sought restitution of \$10,160.25 + \$4,934.44 for
 10 medical benefits paid by the worker's Compensation insurer
 11 attorney fees of \$8,250 to pursue a permanent disability
 12 award of \$55,000, \$26,000 in lost wages and costs for six
 13 more months of psychiatric care even though Martinez
 14 was now working and no longer seeing Dr. Nehorayan.
 15 (RT 20-21-25-26.)

16
 17 The Court awarded \$10,160 for doctor's care \$4,934.34 for
 18 medication and \$26,000 for lost wages, for a total of
 19 \$41,094.34. The Court instructed Martinez

20
 21 "When you receive restitution, you're going to have to
 22 work out with them [The Worker's Compensation Board]
 23 what they need to be reimbursed for and that's something
 24 that you can't forget to do, okay?" (RT 29-12-22.)

25
 26 A Trial Court should not permitted to make an end run
 27 around the plain language of section 1202.4 by ordering
 28 reimbursement to the worker's Compensation insurer through

1 the direct victim. A Trial Court should not by judicial
2 fiat decide that do^{ing} so is an appropriate exercise of the
3 court's power. (Cf. In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal 3d 616
4 621.) The order imposing restitution to Martinez so
5 he can in turn reimburse the worker's Compensation
6 insurer should be reversed.

7
8 C. IMPOSING A RESTITUTION AWARD ATOP THE WORKER'S
9 COMPENSATION BENEFITS GIVES MARTINEZ A DOUBLE RECOVERY

10
11 Under Birkett, the order requiring Martinez to reimburse the
12 worker's Compensation Carrier from restitution proceeds cannot
13 stand as a matter of law. The award should also be vacated
14 to avoid double recovery-it exceeds Martinez' net loss because
15 he already has been compensated for all of his medical
16 loss and most of his loss wages by the worker's Compensation
17 insurance carrier.

18
19 Appellant objected to restitution in the full amount of
20 medical benefits because these were benefits to Mr. Martinez,
21 not loss, and he bore no liability for those costs. In addition,
22 Martinez received a \$55,000 award for permanent disability
23 from the worker's Compensation Board. Appellant objected
24 to making lost wages the state paid Martinez as unemploy-
25 ment benefits an element of restitution because that, too,
26 would constitute double dipping (RT5-10; 14; 16-17.)

1 This is not a situation like that in *Birkett* where the victim
2 insured himself against loss and paid the insurance premi-
3 ums (*People vs. Birkett* *supra* 21 Cal.4th, at p. 247.) As the
4 Court observed, "there is no great novelty in the notion
5 that a person injured or damaged by the wrongful
6 conduct of another even after partial or full reimbur-
7 sement from an independent source" (*Id.* at p. 147, fn. 19.)
8 The rationale supporting the collateral source doctrine is
9 that a victim should not be penalized because he or she
10 "had the thrift and prescience to purchase insurance and
11 the investment represented by the victim's payment of
12 insurance premiums would earn to benefit if they served
13 to mitigate his tort damages" (*Id.*) But, the victim does
14 not reap a double recovery. Typically, the insurer assets
15 a lien against any recovery in tort. (*Id.*)

16
17 In sharp contrast, worker's compensation insurance is not
18 something the injured employee has bought and paid for,
19 and benefits are not triggered by wrongful conduct. Rather,
20 pursuant to state constitutional mandate, the California
21 worker's compensation Act provides for a compulsory scheme
22 of employer no fault liability for injuries arising out of
23 the course of employment. (Cal. Const, art. XIV, § 4.) The
24 purpose of the Act is to provide coverage for medical, surgical,
25 hospital, and other remedial treatment as a requisite to relieve
26 the damaging effects of an on-the-job injury. (*Fitzpatrick*
27 *vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co.* (1936) 7 Cal.2d 230, 233.) An
28 employee who sustains a work related injury is limited

101

1 to recovery under the worker's Compensation System
2 (Lab. Code, § 3600.) Under this exclusivity rule, the injured
3 worker obtain relatively swift and certain benefits without
4 having to prove fault. In exchange, the employee give up
5 the wider range of tort remedies. (Tarres vs Parkhouse Tire
6 Service, Inc, (2007) 26 Cal 4th 995, 1001.) Courts "must be
7 vigilant to preserve the spirit of the act and to prevent
8 a distortion of its purposes" (Scott vs Pacific Coast
9 Borax Co, (1956) 140 Cal App 2d 123, 128.) Just as an
10 injured employee give up tort remedies in exchange for
11 workers Compensation benefits for which he paid no premiums
12 he should be deemed to give up restitution fines which
13 otherwise effectively provide a double recovery. As counsel
14 explained, because of the worker's Compensation Act
15 Martinez suffered no net loss generated by medical
16 expenses. Rather, he received a benefit conferred by the
17 worker's Compensation system, and that's not the same
18 as incurring an actual loss and being made whole for
19 that loss (RT 15-17.) Put another way, ordering the defendants
20 to compensate Martinez for a benefit he has already
21 received doubles that benefit. That is unfair and unjust.
22 It distorts the goal of the restitution statute that real
23 losses be address through restitution.

24
25 D. THE \$26,000 AWARD FOR LOST WAGES SHOULD BE REDUCED
26 TO \$11,880 THE AMOUNT OF MARTINEZ ACTUAL LOST WAGES.

27
28 The \$55,000 award for permanent disability takes into effect

1 that Martinez will not be a wage earner like he was before.
2 (RT 14.) Putting that aside, Appellant conceded that Martinez'
3 temporary disability payments through worker's compensation
4 did not compensate him for the full amount of his lost
5 wages for the relevant period from July 1-2001 to March
6 31-2003 or 33 months. (RT 8.) The difference between
7 what he would have earned was \$360 per month, or \$11,880
8 over 33 months. (RT 10.) Yet, the prosecutor calculated the
9 wages loss without any regard to offset (RT 21) and the
10 Court awarded \$26,000--more than double Martinez'
11 actual loss. Again this is unjust and unfair, and abhor-
12 rent to the rationale behind the restitution statute that it is
13 true losses that are to be compensated. IF the restitution
14 fine is upheld at all, it should be reduced to \$11,880 so that
15 Martinez' compensation is limited to his actual lost wages.

16
17 E. THE RESTITUTION FINE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT CONST-
18 itutes CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF APPELLANT AND
19 HIS FAMILY

20
21 The Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibits
22 cruel and unusual punishment. The defense objected to the
23 restitution fine on the Eighth Amendment grounds. This was
24 not a good faith attempt at restitution. Instead, the real purpose
25 of the fine was to impose additional punishment under
26 the guise of restitution. It was cruel and unusual punish-
27 ment because the defendant would never see a dime in the off
28 chance they ever get out of prison to do any work. The

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1 Prosecutor "just wants to get a pound of flesh and another
2 pint of blood" (RT 25.) Moreover, sums family members provides
3 for some small comfort in prison will be subject to the
4 restitution order. (RT 26)

5
6 In sum, given the fact that Martinez' true economic loss was
7 approximately \$11,880 it was misuse and distortion of
8 the restitution laws to impose a \$41,000 order for
9 restitution. Appellant asks that the order be vacated
10 in its entirety or, in the alternative, that a new order
11 be entered limiting the restitution amount to \$11,880.

12
13 For the reasons given herein, Appellant requests
14 that his conviction be reversed on all counts. In the
15 alternative, the restitution fine should be reversed or
16 reduce to \$11,880.

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ELMER R. BAUTISTA

Police Report

Mr Bautista gave the following Statements

(1)

Mr Bautista is a taxi driver by profession. On Friday night June 29-2001. Two friends namely "Paco and Meno" asked Bautista if he had any plans for the following Sunday night July 1-2001. Bautista told Paco and Meno that he would be available on the night in question. Paco and Meno then told Bautista that they wanted him to drive them to Glendale on Sunday night.

(2)

As previously agreed upon Bautista drove Paco and Meno to Glendale that following Sunday night Bautista drove his Chev. Caprice. Bautista was directed to a "Taco Bell Restaurant" Bautista parked on the street south of Taco Bell. Meno then asked Bautista if he wanted to make some money. Bautista inquired how the money would be made? "Meno" replied that he was a friend of a "Female employee Janette" at Taco Bell who was going to give him money. Bautista warned Meno that he would tell the police everything if the money was obtained illegally. Meno got out of Bautista's Caprice and entered a "Gray Honda Accord" parked on a side street near a Taco Bell.

(3)

Thereafter Bautista saw "Paco" slash the tires of a car parked in the Taco Bell parking lot. Bautista and Paco later followed the same car to a parking lot in a shopping

Center Close to Taco Bell "Janette" and a male employee of Taco Bell occupied the car at the shopping center parking lot the male and Janette repaired the slashed tire that was cause by Paco.

(4)

Bautista approached the male and Janette and as instructed by Paco he was told to move their car to a side street near the shopping center Janette was inside the car when Bautista was ask to move it from the shopping center to the side street Meno was now also parked on the same side street near the shopping center in his Honda Accord

(5)

Bautista then drove the male to the Taco Bell and to the Bank of America in his chev Caprice. Upon Bautista return with the male from Taco Bell and the Bank Paco was still in the car with Janette Bautista saw that Janette was crying and this angered him (Bautista)

(6)

(19) I asked Bautista if he recalled being stopped by a police officer while he had the Taco Bell employee in his Caprice? Bautista recalled the incident saying that the officer stopped him because the license plate on the back of his car was not showing. Bautista said that he gassed up the car somewhere on Broadway after arriving at Taco Bell and probably forgot to flip the license plate up after gassing up.

(7)

Bautista denied that he was armed with a handgun during the robbery and said he received \$40.00 for his part of driving

1 people around.

2 (-8)

3/ Bautista denied that he sexually assaulted Jonette.

4 (9)

5 At the Conclusion of the interview Bautista agreed to show
6 us where Meno and Paco Lived.

7 (10)

8 Bautista directed us to a multi unit apartment building at
9 854 Harvard Street in Los Angeles. Bautista said that
10 Meno sometimes resided at the Harvard address with family
11 members. Bautista stated that Meno's Sister was the apartment
12 manager and that she resided in one of the first three apart-
13 ments on the right hand side of the first floor. Bautista said
14 that Meno cell phone number was (213) 278-9614

15 (11)

16 Thereafter Bautista directed us to 3649 3rd Avenue in Los Angeles
17 Bautista said that Paco lived in a detached residence at the
18 rear of the residence a 3649 3rd Avenue Bautista said that
19 Paco lived in a small house with his wife and two children

20 Bautista show us Paco Gray Toyota 4-Runner parked across the
21 street from 3649 3rd plate Bautista had described the 4-Runner
22 and paper plate to us prior to our arrival. Bautista said that Paco
23 cell phone number was (213) 841-5740

24 (12)

25 Bautista was Transported to Glendale City Jail where he
26 was booked and Confined.

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1 At approximately 0200 hours I spoke to Bautista at
2 the Glendale City Jail with the assistance of C.S.O.
3 Jailer Elsa Urquiza. Bautista told me the last time
4 he was at Paco's residence on 3rd Avenue in Los Angeles
5 was previous Saturday Night June 30-2001. Bautista
6 sketched an outline of Paco's residence for me. The sketch
7 has been saved as evidence.

8
9
10 Evaluating Statements by Mr. Bautista and why Mr. Bautista
11 is guilty of the robbery, but not the kidnapping or any sexual
12 assaults.

13
14 Reviewing the police report

15
16 Bautista says he does not want to be involved in any illegal
17 things or he will tell the police everything.

18 (Question) (1)

19 When he witness Paco slashing tires, why didn't he just leave?
20 or why didn't he make a phone call to the police and report a
21 crime was being committed to someone's vehicle like he said he would?
22 Instead he follows the vehicle "why?"

23
24 Bautista says that Paco and Meno had ask him if he could give
25 them a ride to Glendale on Sunday night. And Bautista respond
26 yes.

27 (Question) (2)

28 why did the boys need Bautista? Bautista says Meno was on

1 a Gray Honda Accord park on a side street waiting on "who or
2 what?" And if the boys had a vehicle, this tells the Court
3 Petitioner Bautista services were not needed, So why was he
4 there?

5
6 Now take notice there's now Three Cars involved, Petitioner
7 Bautista "Chevrolet Caprice" Meno's "Gray Honda Accord"
8 and Pedro Martinez Brown Honda the Pedro and Janette
9 were in

10
11 Evidence and statements on Bautista Police Report proves that
12 there's is more to the case than it's being told. For example
13 notice the dates. They meet on Friday June 2-2007 then they
14 put the plan together on Saturday June 30-2007 at Paco's house
15 at a party and Execute it on Sunday July 1-2007.

16
17 Another example Petitioner Bautista is instructed to take Pedro
18 car and move it. He's taking orders from Paco.

19
20 By the statements Mr. Bautista gave to the police trying to
21 make himself an innocent by-stander. Unknowingly he has
22 told the Court of his involvement with the robbery Concerning
23 the Taco Bell incident.

Ground # 9

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1 ~~Petitioner Conviction was obtain do to Ineffective~~
2 ~~Assistance of Counsel A Violation of Petitioner's~~
3 ~~6th and 14th Amendment Due Process. Therefore Petitioner~~
4 ~~Challenges Counts 4-14 Oral Copulation Rape~~

5
6 Supporting Facts

7 ~~Defense Attorney showed no interest or assistance~~
8 ~~when Mr Bautista was being falsely accused of Counts~~
9 ~~of Oral Copulation or Rape.~~

10
11 ~~Defense Attorney did not move to clearly make the~~
12 ~~jury understand that D.N.A. From experts clearly~~
13 ~~excluded Petitioner of any sexuals assaults~~

14
15 ~~Defense Attorney action and a non-interest in Petitioner~~
16 ~~Case presented no interest of the fundamental right~~
17 ~~of Petitioner and deprived him his due process.~~

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110

Petitioner was being falsely accused and convicted of committing Rape and Oral Copulation against (Janette A.) when the victim with her own testimony stated. It was Moran who had committed the Rape and not the Petitioner (vol 5-935-936-937) Then again Expert witness testify that the D.N.A. excluded the Petitioner Bautista as the semen donor. "But found a match to Moran" Then Janette said that Petitioner had removed the tape that held her hands tie with his teeth, yet expert did not find any saliva or any mention of any teeth marks seem to have appear on this tape that was brought in as evidence also see (8-RT-2726) and (8-RT-2434-2435) (5-RT-943) Petitioner base his argument on evidence presented on Transcripts, which points out that there is substantial evidence without a doubt of innocence. Petitioner also argues that the Court itself was put aware of the wrong doing, that the Court seem to ignore. (5-RT 1041) Petitioner ask the Court to witness what Judge Nancy Brown was address concerning this case on "The Taco Bell Robbery" also presented will be evidence of False Accusation, Contradicting statements Perjury, and Now everything Janette and Pedro testify to is fabricated.

Contradiction, Fabrication Perjury False Accusation

Comparing Pedro Martinez Testimony and Janette Alcazar. Also Questioning their statements.

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1 Comparison on Victims Testimonies Concerning the Taco
2 Bell Robbery CREDIBILITY

3
4 Pedro Martinez 4-CT 98-3-8

5 Q. Now could you describe the Lighting Condition at the shopping
6 Center on Windsor and Central?

7 A. yes it was (very bright a lot of lights) All the (other stores
8 had their lights on inside the shopping center) the shopping
9 center it's self has different lights in the parking lot it's (like
10 daytime.)

11
12 Janette Alcazar 5-CT 921-2-7

13 Q. The car in? would you please tell me, could you describe what
14 was the (lighting like in the shopping center) area that you called
15 the Plaza?

16 A. (It was dark) there was--- (It was really dark.) There were
17 no car nobody.

18
19 Janette Alcazar 5-CT-923-25-27

20 Q. Are there (lights on the building of the shopping center) if
21 you remember?

22 A. (NO.)

23
24 Janette Alcazar 5-CT-923-12-15

25 Q. And is that street (illuminated by the street lights?)

26 A. They're (hardly any street lights) There is but not a lot
27 (not much.)

28

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1 Pedro Martinez

4-CT-100-2-10

2 Q. Okay, then what happened?

3 A. Then (she says the guy has a gun.)

4 Q. What did you do in response to hearing that?

5 A. I stand up and I looked towards, towards Central (And I
6 saw this guy coming with a gun in his hand pointing down) and
7 with a hat on his head.9 Janette Alcazar

5-CT-926-6-4

10 Q. What happened next?

11 A. After the car disappeared suddenly- well, I ignored it and
12 we started. Peter was changing the tire. And suddenly this guy
13 comes in from the driveway with (I guess) he was coming like fast
14 towards us. And he-- (I guess he had a gun) and he told us
15 (Don't look at me turn around if you don't I'll shoot you guy
16 and we--)18 Pedro Martinez

4-CT-366-18-22

19 Q. What happened next?

20 A. He keep talking to me and also reminding me (not to look
21 at him.) And asking me about the safe. That if I didn't
22 cooperate they were going to kill me.

1 Pedro Martinez 1 4 CT 102-22-26

2 A. I didn't do anything. I just stood there until (he hit me)

3 Then saying he wasn't playing. that he wanted me to get (inside
4 my car) with Janette in the back of my car.

5
6 Janette Alcazar 2 5-CT 929-15-18

7 So he jumped to the front and then Peter could find the keys so
8 he (punched Peter on the stomach with his elbow)

9
10
11
12 Pedro Martinez 3 4 CT 324-2-8

13 A. Some kind of sticky tape

14
15 Janette Alcazar 4 5 CT 925-7-8

16 A. yes it was like---There was---it was like "another---"

17
18 Comparison is obvious

19 (1st)

20 Pedro says he was being punched / hit when he was outside of
21 his vehicle by Bautista.

22 (2nd)

23 Janette says Pedro was punch in the stomach by Bautista inside
24 the car by Bautista elbow because he couldn't find the keys

25 (Bautista response)

26 When Pedro was examine for any bruising injury marks or
27 signs of any kind of physical beating nothing was ever found
28 yet he claims that he was being beat at Taco Bell in the car outside

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1 the car in the parking lot and being hit with guns and yet
2 not a mark was found to support his statements.

3
4
5 Pedro says it was some kind of stick tape that Bautista had
6 bound his hands with

7
8 Janette in the other hand seem to not really think this was
9 the tape that bound her hands above her head.

10 (Bautista response)

11 The tape that was present in court was a tape that is use in
12 Taco Bell to seal Boxes. And it was bunch up and what seem
13 to be hair on it see (Declaration) and see how this hair got
14 on the tape. Then on (5-CT 942) she made a statement saying
15 Bautista had use his teeth to rip the tape off her hands. However
16 Evidence would have shown saliva, or teeth marks, or finger
17 prints, of Bautista yet nothing was ever found why?

18
19
20 Take Notice of Statements made by Pedro &
21 Janette.

22
23 Pedro Martinez

4-CT 324-16-21

24 A. My answer was that I assume he wanted to go and take
25 the money from Taco Bell.

26 Bautista's Response

27 Take Notice no one had said or even hint anything about
28 Robbering Taco Bell so why would Pedro say that to a

1 Supposedly Stranger. Now would Pedro know what Bautista
2 intentions were unless Pedro already knew a robbery
3 was to take place.

4
5 Take notice how Pedro tries to protect (Paco and Mino)
6 4-CT-341 their talking about when Pedro and Bautista return
7 to tell Mino what had happened when the police pull
8 them over because of the plates

9 Pg. 341.

10 Q. Did you hear Janette speak to him when he pulled up next
11 to your vehicle

12 A. No.

13 Q. Did you see Janette when you pull up next to your vehicle?

14 A. No

15 Q. Did you know who was inside of that vehicle?

16 A. I know Janette was there with some one else.

17
18 Pedro Martinez 5-CT-101-20-21

19 A. He asked me if the car was ready. If the tire was fixed
20 already?

21 Bautista Response

22 Anyone would know that if a man with a gun which you've
23 seen and looking very suspicious who intentions are to
24 Rob you, Beat you, Kidnap you, and have his way with
25 your female friend, The last thing in his mind is the
26 concern if your flat tire is fix and if your car is ready.

27

28

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1 Janette Alcazar

5-CT-942

2 Janette said that the second time Bautista came into
3 Pedro Car. That he showed concern and ask her if Paco
4 had harm... Then tell her okay pull your pants off
5 And when she refused he then made her put his penis
6 in her mouth.

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1 Ground 10

2 Petitioner Conviction is based on mere Speculations
3 and a Miscarriage of Justice. which petitioner
4 will present to the Court Evidences and not
5 speculations that said Courts do not apply to
6 Petitioner in a Motion Fashion

7
8 Supporting Facts

9 Petitioner base his arguments on the evidence that he
10 will presented. And on that the prosecution fail to
11 present evidence in supporting any of the counts
12 that were imposed. Petitioner was accused and
13 convicted, do to ineffective assistance of Counsel and
14 mere speculation. And no real substantial evidence
15 of said counts. These arguments will present what
16 the witness/victims said did or accused, Bautista
17 of doing, then see how it involves Bautista and
18 how the Courts allowed Bautista to be use as
19 an escape goat. The Court will witness questions and
20 answers that will prove Bautista is innocent with
21 out a doubt.

22
23 Requesting Dismissal on said Counts 4-14-1-2-5-6-7
24 See why on the Taco Bell incident, and a full dismissal
25 on The EL POCO LOCO incident

26

27

28

1 Elmer R. Bautista V-34019

2 P.O. Box 3421-3C02-102

3 CS P Corcoran Ca, 93212-3421

4
5 In Propria Persona

6
7
8 United States Southern District Court

9 Elmer R. Bautista

Case No. GA-051210

10 Petitioner

Motion Requesting

11 vs

Dismissal Penal Code

12 Darrel Adams

995 on Counts #4 #14

13 warden & Respondent

14
15 Count (4) 288(2) (C) (2) Oral Copulation- Count (14) 209

16 (b) (1) Kidnap (of Janette A.) to Commit rape

17
18 Allegations against Mr. Bautista

19 I was said by Janette that Mr. Bautista had come and

20 got into the car where he earlier tied her and Pedro

21 Martinez with some sticky tape (4RT323-324 5RT677

22 929-930) which later that same night removed this tape

23 by using his teeth placing his mouth on the sticky tape

24 and pulling it off of her with his hands. Then she accused

25 Bautista of Masturbating and making her put his

26 Penis in her mouth by force and making her suck his Penis

27 Here's why evidence will prove to the court that all

28 her testimony is Fabricated.

1 (1) Janette Claimed Petitioner Bautista "Came into the car"
2 where she was tied up.

3 (EVIDENCE)

4 Expert witness testify in Trial that they had went through
5 the "inside of the Car Looking for Finger prints And
6 there was no Finger prints of Mr Bautista found inside
7 the Car.)"

8
9 (2) Janette Claimed that it was Mr. Bautista who tied her
10 and Pedro up with a sticky tape and it was Mr. Bautista
11 who drove Pedro Car. And then later that Night that
12 it was Mr. Bautista who untied her by using his teeth
13 to rip of the tape off by placing his mouth and
14 hands on the sticky tape.

15 (EVIDENCE)

16 Expert witness testify in Trial that they Check the
17 tape that supposedly had hair from Janette head.
18 But ("DID NOT") Find any ("Teeth Mark") or Mr. Bautista
19 ("Saliva or his Finger print") on the tape or Car.

20
21 (3) Janette claim he had masturbated

22 (EVIDENCE)

23 Expert witness testify in Trial there wasn't any semen
24 of Mr. Bautista found in the (Car) in (Janette Body) or her
25 (Clothes) And there was (No Finger prints) found in the (Car) she
26 Claim Mr. Bautista got in, to make her do any of the
27 things she claim happened between her and Mr. Bautista,
28 this offense's never Happened. Yet the Jury Convicted

1 of these two Courts (4) (14) without evidence and
2 because Petitioner Bautista had no representation
3 when it came to his due process, Or effective Counseling.

4 Making it Clear

5 EVIDENCE

6 Expert DNA witness

7
8 stated in Court that there was no evidence of
9 Mr. Bautista ever being inside the car with Pedro
10 Martinez or Janette A. The experts dusted for
11 Fingerprints, Saliva, hair, blood, or Semen inside the
12 car and found nothing that would link Mr. Bautista
13 as being in this car of Pedro Martinez, not even on
14 the sticky tape. Read the victims testimony and you'll
15 see that these victims state Mr. Bautista was inside
16 the car doing all kinds of things. So why isn't any
17 thing found that links Bautista? Now the evidence are
18 here yet the Courts in the state level insist on
19 ignoring the truth.

Elmer R. Bautista C.D.C. No. V-34019

P.O. Box 3421-3022-102

C.S.P. Carceran #1

Carceran Co. 93212-3471

California Supreme

In Propria Persona; Court

Elmer R. Bautista

Case NO. GA-051210

Petitioner

Notice to request

-VS-

Counts 1 2 5 6 7 to

D. Adams

Be dismissed

warden

P.C. 995

All said counts are P.C. 211 / 2nd degree robbery.

Petitioner presents the California Supreme Court with arguments and evidence, that said offense do not apply to him. And that said offense's never took place No #1 2

#5 #6 #7

FACTS

It was alleged that Mr. Bautista was one of the individuals that had in fact commit the robbery against Mr. Martinez Taco Bell and again of a sum of \$10.00 from Martinez and for the third time he was accused of a 211 second degree burglary of Taco Bell.

Evidence

In response to these charges Petitioner presents arguments and request the Court to review statements that were presented on prelim and Trial. Now on the Charges of Robbery not anywhere in the whole Trial dose it

1 show or present Mr. Bautista robbing anything in fact a
2 Taco Bell Surveillance Cameras hard drive shows Mr. Bautista
3 entering the Taco Bell and his walking behind Mr. Martinez
4 and his hands are in his back pockets. These are the
5 images that were pick-up by the surveillance camera.
6 However I ask the court to review Mr. Martinez actions
7 and to witness how he voluntarily dose things on his
8 own without being asked by Mr. Bautista.

9
10 Mr. Martinez after realizing that it would be impossible to
11 get into the safe. He gets a plastic bag from behind the counter
12 goes and opens all three registers takes the money from them
13 places the money in this plastic bag and hands it to
14 Mr. Bautista. However the the alarm never goes off, because
15 Mr. Martinez "TURN IT OFF." And yet has the nerve to say
16 Mr. Bautista assaulted him, when expert witness found
17 no evidence to support that they were an assault. And
18 no where on the Trial or prelim dose it say Mr. Bautista
19 ask him to do any of the above. And to add salt to the
20 wound he claims he threw in \$10.00 dollars of his own
21 pocket, plus \$300.00 from his own personal saving, and lets
22 not foreget he accused Mr. Bautista of removing the
23 surveillance camera film, Mr. Bautista said he open it and
24 ask me to take it because he had the "KEY". Mr. Bautista
25 admits he was aware of what was happening. And Mr. Bautista
26 admits to being a accomplice to the robbery. But he wasn't
27 alone on this, yet Mr. Martinez got rewarded \$47000.00
28 dollars for committing a crime. And Mr. Bautista recieved

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1 26 years 8 months plus Two life sentences just for being there
2 and the Attorney use him as an "escape goat."

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1 Ground ~~B~~ 10

2 ~~Petitioner Presents the Court with his own Personal Declaration~~
3 ~~For the Court to review and Compare to the Ground argued.~~

4
5 Supporting Facts

6 Petitioner Declaration is what actually happened and
7 Petitioner Bautista's intentions are to clear up the record
8 and hope this Case is Presented to Judge Nancy Brown
9 so those who have benefit and used Bautista for an
10 except goat won't go unpunish by the law I've separate
11 these two Case so that my arguments and evidence may
12 be more clearer to the Court and so I can resentence me
13 and see that the only thing I wish to plea guilty to
14 is The Robbery,

15
16 My next writ will soon follow

17
18
19 *Thank you*
20
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Declaration

Mr. Bautista introduces to the Court his personal declaration of what actually happened. Concerning the robbery that had taken place on the date of July 2-2007 at a Taco Bell Restaurant... And why it is "NECESSARY" that the Court reviews this declaration and Petition and all its contents, Petitioner with the assistance of another inmate here in Corcoran State Prison wishes to exercise his right to be heard as to what he was told to say nothing of what he knew by his Defense Attorney. Bautista request that after reviewing this Petition that he is hereby ordered by the Court to return and be brought before the Honorable Judge Nancy Brown who he feels is the only Person in the Court who knew Bautista was innocent of some Charges... Such as (288(a)(C)(2) Oral Copulation on (Janette A.) (209(b)(2) Kidnap of Janette A.) to Commit rape.) Mr. Bautista request to be heard and to confront those individuals who were as much involved and participated in this Crime of the Taco Bell Robbery. And those who have benefit at the expense of sentencing Mr. Bautista to Life in prison. Petitioner will present his encounters with each of the individuals and will present error that these individual made in their testimony which will expose them as being involve and knowing Mr. Bautista.

Antonio Moran AKA Paco- Guillermina Jimenez AKA Mine Elmer Rokael Bautista- All knew each other from parties gathering and in many occasions they met or came across each other path because of Mr. Bautista's profession as a

1 Taxi driver. Petitioner Mr Bautista first encounter with a
2 (Ms Janette Alcazar) was I believe a year or so prior to
3 this incident of the robbery on Taco Bell. I many occasions
4 Mr Bautista pickup Janette A. at her Job, and shopping
5 centers, Parks, and at parties, or Just gathering. In many
6 occasion Bautista would party with Janette and he
7 remember being introduced to (Pedro Martinez). He remember
8 giving them rides to their homes and at time motels. And when
9 it was ^xPedro Martinez it would be Carlos, Moran, or Guillemine,
10 and on occasion Bautista she was known as what Hispanics
11 call a (muñeca) in translation is a (Toy Doll) or just a (Toy)
12 which is something you play with for awhile and when tired
13 of it you just put it away til you get the need to play
14 with it again. Therefore being pick out of a photo line up or
15 knowing Bautista by Janette R. and Pedro M. was no great task.
16 in their behalf. Also Petitioner ^{dosen't} wants the Court to think that
17 Petitioner Bautista is ~~not~~ here to get vengeance against anyone
18 Petitioner is making this declaration so that the Court may see
19 what actually happened and how it all came to be.

20 A.

21 On Friday night Petitioner Bautista was Call on his Cell Phone and
22 ask to meet with Paco and Mino at the home of Paco sister house
(23) or /apartment. when he arrive the men went outside to talk the
24 Men present were Paco, Mino, Carlos, Pedro, and Bautista, the
25 plan was to make it look like a "Pedro and Janette" were force
26 to assist Bautista and Paco and Mino in the robbery
27 The plan was that Pedro and Janette Vehicle got a Flat
28 and they had stopped to repair it. (THE TRUTH) the

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1 Car Janette and Pedro were on NEVER did have a flat tire, they
2 slash the spare tire with a Kitchen Knife. That's how Janette
3 knew a Knife was used, and she also knew where the slash
4 was because she witness the tire being slash by Paco we all
5 witness it. And it was ^{it} a slash it was a stabbed. So as to the
6 statement she maded as to her discovering the slash on the
7 tire in the dark this is not so.

8 B.

9 As to the Car-Jack it was lay-out on the ground for show in case
10 some-one got suspicious. [I]F the investigators would have taken
11 real notice they would have found the Car-Jack was just carelessly
12 drop feets away from the car and nowhere near the tire that
13 supposedly had been flaten. Janette part in The Taco Bell robbery
14 at this time was to be a look-out while the men made their plans
15 and to all agreed on what was to take place, And what they
16 needed to know, when Janette warn the men that a Cop was patrolling
17 the area. So they moved to a different Place on a side Street

18 C.

19 Bautista and Pedro got into Pedro Honda and Pedro was driving
20 that's why Bautista finger prints were never found on Pedro steering
21 wheel. Bautista "NEVER" drove Pedro a car, and Janette was never
22 with them, because Pedro and Bautista were talking about what
23 had to be done.

24 D.

25 Paco and Janette had to switch cars with Pedro and Bautista
26 and Mino was standing as look out as everyone else was switching
27 car Mino job was to sit there with a Cell Phone waiting to
28 hear from Bautista and Pedro letting him know if anything

1 goes wrong. And Paco and Janette were fooling around in
2 Pedro Car in the back seat. It was said that when Paco and
3 Janette were in the back fooling around and Paco was on top of
4 Janette that Janette had layed her head on some sticky
5 tape that is use in Taco Bell to wrap boxes up with therefore
6 when the subject of a sticky Tape being use to bound Paco
7 and Janette hands came up Petitioner was dump-founded
8 and Confused, for the mere fact that, Petitioner had no idea
9 what they were blameing him for. Then Janette makes the
10 statement about Petitioner Bautista rip it off her with his
11 teeth (942) yet no saliva of Petitioner was ever found on
12 this sticky tape.

13 E.
14 During the time Pedro and Bautista left, Mino was keeping
15 his girlfriend inform of what was going on and who was
16 doing what, and with whom. Mino girlfriend was involved
17 Then Pedro and Bautista set out to do their part when they
18 were pull over by a police Car because the License plate wasn't
19 on right and they needed to fix it. When the police officer
20 Came up to the Car he had a Flash Light and was Looking in-
21 side the Car. Pedro advise Bautista to keep quiet and he'd
22 do all the talking because Bautista dose not speak any
23 english any barely understands it. Bautista was ask for
24 his License and he response that he had left them at home
25 However as the officer continue on asking question Bautista
26 found him-self dumbfounded for the simple reason that Petitioner
27 Bautista "Dose NOT understand English or Reads or write it!"
28 Therefore Pedro found himself in a situation where he knew

1 he had to do something to Protect his mission and his
2 Accomplice's therefore he became the Translator for Bautista.

3
4 Here's the evidence that also ProoFs Pedro was an accomplice's
5 as well as an inside man. TAKE NOTICE, Pedro Claimed
6 he was being Kidnap, against his will and that Bautista
7 held a gun, to him and that he was be^{en} beaten, and
8 threaten.... However Pedro and Bautista are being stopped
9 by an officer and the Opportunity to say something to the
10 officer presents its self, and he doesn't. Remember, Bautista
11 has no idea what Pedro and the officer is saying to each
12 other, so why not tell the officer he's being Kidnap
13 Beaten Threaten and there's a gun in the car.... Evidence
14 are obvious, therefore all Kidnapping and Rabbery Charges
15 must "be reversed"

16 F.

17 while driving away Pedro and Bautista decided they'll let
18 the rest of the accomplice know what had happened so
19 Bautista drove back and drove up to Mino Car and told
20 him what had happened and Pedro ask where was Pace
21 and Mino answer with a wink and a smile as they all
22 looked towards Pedro Car they all laugh and then they
23 left. Pedro and Bautista arrived at The Taco Bell and
24 Bautista told Pedro this looks to obvious so they move
25 to a different spot then Pedro told Bautista wait til
26 I turn off the alarm then come in follow me and that
27 how Bautista got inside The Taco Bell then Pedro went
28 ahead and hit the Lights and walk over to where the safe

1 was and put his key into the safe went to turn it and
2 nothing happened. He was under the understanding that
3 his key would over ride the "Electronic-Timer" on the safe
4 or atleast that's what he was told. Because the next words
5 that Pedro said in spanish were "That Lying Bitch!" Pedro next
6 action was that of a desperate person, so he walked behind
7 the counter grabbing some plastic bags and started opening
8 and taking money from cash-register, and placing it into a
9 plastic bag. After that he hand it to Bautista and order him
10 to get the Video Tape out of the Camera. That why when they
11 presented the NEGATIVE of the tape it showed. Petitioner Bautista
12 walking in with his hand down then places them in his back
13 pockets and Just following Pedro around and watching him from
14 a distant. And then tells Bautista where the "Hidden Video Tape"
15 is and how to take it out with destroying the Caseing. See
16 how by his own actions and statements during this "Robbery"
17 Shows his an Accomplice and notice whos doing the "Robbery"
18 (1) Pedro used his key to get inside. (2) He tells Bautista to wait
19 til he turn of the alarm off! (3) He dose not turn the high lights
20 on. (4) He goes and trys his key on the safe. (5) He Voluntary
21 grabs a Plastic bags and starts taking money from the registers
22 I ask the Court to listen to his testimony of the inside man and
23 the actions of Janette A. (For example.) who ask or told him speaking
24 of Pedro to go through the Cash-register in search for money?
25 where in his testimony dose he say Bautista ask me about the
26 register? "NEVER"! All this he Voluntary did on his own and
27 the worse part is telling Bautista where the Hidden Video Tape
28 was and how to remove it without damageing the Caseing.

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1 And as for (Janette A) Charges against Bautista they must all
2 be reversed for the mere fact that Bautista was never around
3 Janette that night.

4 G.

5 Now Bautista and Pedro drove to Pedro Place then Pedro decided
6 to stop and ask Bautista to wait and he ran inside and a
7 few minutes later came out and got into Petitioner and request
8 to go to the bank. Pedro then told Petitioner to wait and he
9 walk up to the ATM and made a withdraw Bautista
10 waited outside his car for until Pedro return and he payed
11 Bautista \$40.00 for his services and Bautista drove him
12 to where Paco Mino and Janette were waiting. within
13 second after they arrived everyone started blameing each
14 other and pointing fingers and yelling and so on Petitioner
15 was aware of the robbery and was a participation in it
16 but not on the accusations concerning Kidnap Rape Oral
17 Copulation. Therefore a reversed is in order and a resentencing
18 or a New Trial is in order

1 Case No GA 051210

2
3 In Propria Persona

4 Elmer R. Bautista

5
6 Superior Court Los Angeles

7 County Los Angeles


8
9 Respondent to denial of writ of habeas Corpus:

10
11 In response to the denial 11-13-07, Petitioner Bautista,
12 Intention were under good faith to bring these arguments and
13 prove to the Superior Court, Arguments that the Appellate
14 Court presented, Petitioner felt that they were of great
15 interest concerning and stating the facts of how unfair
16 petitioners Trial had been. Therefore it was a "must-do,"
17 in petitioners behalf that he felt it was necessary to
18 represent to the Superior Court with all these arguments
19 and evidence of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, and Court
20 errors, including District Attorney misconduct. The point
21 that Mr Bautista is hoping to do was to introduce to the
22 Court how the Court knowingly allowed the petitioner to
23 be used as an escaped goat, so that others may benefit.
24 Petitioner request that the Court present proof in how said
25 crimes apply to Petitioner. Petitioner argued to the Court
26 that he recieved Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and
27 the evidence are without a doubt presented here by Petitioner
28 "Robbery" Not anywhere in the whole Trial dose it shows

1 Petitioner robbing anything he was handed a "bag to hold."
2 But who was really robbing the Taco Bell register and
3 putting the money in a plastic bag? And who ask him to do it
4 it was the petitioner? And why hand it to the Petitioner to
5 hold the Petitioner not once says "give me the bag of money"
6 And where did the money go? Did it in the whole trial stated
7 where the money go or who ended up with it? Now let see
8 the numbers Martinez claimed there were "Three Cash registers
9 and he claims there were \$25.00 dollars on each one of them plus
10 he threw in \$10.00 dollar of his own pocket plus 300.00 from his own
11 personal saving it comes up to \$535.00. Now how much did
12 Mr Bautista get paid \$40.00 and that was for what? being
13 a taxi driver to a crime he was aware of. Therefore Mr Bautista
14 dose not denied being a participation to the robbery, however
15 he was not the mastermind or the robber. He was the driver yet
16 everyone of the real Criminal received an outdate and the Trial
17 attorney made Mr Bautista look to the jury as if he was the
18 mastermind behind everything. Mr Bautista intentions were
19 for the Court to correct this wrong doing that had been done
20 to an individual who because he speaks no English, reads it
21 or writes or understands it. Gives anyone the right to take advan-
22 tage his handicap. Or because he's from other County. (Kidnappin
23 Mr Bautista presented on his declaration that's it impossible
24 to Kidnap anyone when their the drivers or the one's giving you
25 instructions on where to go. (Oral CPLTN by force) The Transcripts
26 show no where any evidence where it links Mr Bautista to
27 this crime. So how is it that Mr Bautista must be held
28 responsible for counts that were impose upon him that don't apply

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1 to him in any way form or fashion, yet the Court sees no
2 ineffective Assistance of Counsel. And the response for
3 denial is "The Jury found him guilty of said Counts." This
4 is not about the jury this is about right and wrong, this
5 is about our laws ignoring the Truth. They the Court
6 states that Mr. Bautista had a choice during Trial to
7 say what he knew and could have help him in his defense.
8 Again Petitioner Bautista reminds the Court of his declara-
9 tion, he was advise by his defense attorney to say nothing
10 therefore ineffective Assistance of Counsel is there. However
11 again the Court ignores the evidence and hide the truth
12 by blaming the Jury.

13
14 
15 Respectfully Submitted

16
17 signature Peter Bautista C.D.C. NO. V-34019

18 Date 1-3-08
19
20
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23
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25
26
27
28

MARY JAMESON
AUTOMATIC APPEALS SUPERVISOR

JORGE NAVARRETE
SUPERVISING DEPUTY CLERK

SAN FRANCISCO

NATALIE ROBINSON
SUPERVISING DEPUTY CLERK

LOS ANGELES



Supreme Court of California

FREDERICK K. OHLRICH
COURT ADMINISTRATOR AND
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

January 14, 2008

Elmer T. Bautista V-34019
CSP – Corcoran #1
P. O. Box 3471 (3C02-102)
Corcoran, CA 93212-3471

Re: S136719 (B173331) – People v Bautista


Dear Sir:

Returned herein is your document received 1-10-2008. Please be advised that the order filed on 10-26-2005 denying your petition for review is final forthwith and may not be reconsidered or reinstated. As to your other case, B174565, the Court of Appeal docket shows that all documents were refiled in a different case (B173331), which is referenced above.

The court does not state the reason for the denial of petitions brought before it. Please rest assured, however, that the entire court considered the petition, and the contentions made therein, and the denial expresses the court's decision in this matter.

Very truly yours,

FREDERICK K. OHLRICH
Court Administrator and
Clerk of the Supreme Court


By: H. Miner, Deputy Clerk

HM/hm
Enclosures

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NATALIE ROBINSON
SUPERVISING DEPUTY CLERK

LOS ANGELES



Supreme Court of California

FREDERICK K. OHLRICH
COURT ADMINISTRATOR AND
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

1-15-2007

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Elmer R. Bautista, V-34019
P. O. Box 3471 - 3C02-102
C.S.P. - Corcoran
Corcoran, Ca 93212-3471

Re: People v. Elmer R. Bautista, et al. - B173331

Dear Mr. Bautista:

We hereby return unfiled your petition for review, which we received 1-10-2008. A check of the Court of Appeal docket shows that the judgment was affirmed 7-26-2005. This court lost jurisdiction to act on any petition for review 9-24-05. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e).) Without this jurisdiction, this court is unable to consider your request for legal relief.

Very truly yours,

FREDERICK K. OHLRICH
Court Administrator and
Clerk of the Supreme Court

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. Allen", is written over the typed name.
By: A. Allen, Deputy Clerk

Aa/
Rec.

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five - No. B173331
S136719

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ELMER ROKAEL BAUTISTA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Petitions for review DENIED.

GEORGE
Chief Justice

*Filed
10-26-2005*

VERIFICATION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF KINGS

(C.C.P. SEC. 446 & 2015.5; 28 U.S.C. 1746)

I, Bautista E DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT:
I AM THE Petitioner IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTION. I HAVE
READ THE FOREGOING DOCUMENTS AND KNOW THE CONTENTS THEREOF AND
THE SAME IS TRUE OF MY OWN KNOWLEDGE, EXCEPT AS TO MATTERS STATED
THEREIN UPON INFORMATION, AND BELIEF, AND AS TO THOSE MATTERS, I
BELIEVE THEM TO BE TRUE.

EXECUTED THIS 4 DAY OF 15 2008
AT CORCORAN, CALIFORNIA.

(SIGNATURE)

Bautista E
(DECLARANT/PRISONER)

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

(C.C.P. SEC. 1013 (a) & 2015.5; 28 U.S.C. SEC. 1746)

I Bautista E AM A RESIDENT OF
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, I AM OVER THE AGE OF
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS OF AGE AND AM / A PARTY OF THE ABOVE INTITLED
ACTION. MY ADDRESS IS P.O. BOX 3471, CORCORAN, CA. 93212.

ON 4 - 15 2008 IS SERVED THE FOREGOING.

(SET FORTH EXACT TITLE OF DOCUMENTS SERVED)

ON THE PARTY(S) HEREIN BY PLACING A TRUE COPY(S) THEREOF, ENCLOSED IN A
SEALED ENVELOPE(S), WITH POSTAGE THEREON FULLY PAID, IN THE UNITED STATES
MAIL, IN A DEPOSIT BOX SO PROVIDED AT CORCORAN STATE PRISON.

THERE IS DELIVERY SERVICE BY UNITED STATES MAIL AT THE PLACE SO ADDRESSED,
AND THERE IS REGULAR COMMUNICATION BY MAIL BETWEEN THE PLACE OF MAILING
AND THE PLACE SO ADDRESSED, I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE
FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

DATE:

4 - 15 2008

Bautista E
(DECLARANT/PRISONER)